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Introduction
Megatrials are very large randomized controlled trials
(RCTs) – usually recruiting thousands of subjects and
usually multicentred — and their methodological hallmark is
that recruitment criteria are highly inclusive, protocols are
maximally simplified, and end points are unambiguous (eg
mortality). Megatrials have been put forward – especially
by the ‘evidence-based-medicine’ movement’ – as the cri-
terion reference source of evidence, superior to any other
method for measuring the effectiveness or effect size of
medical interventions.
This aggrandizement of megatrials to a position of superi-
ority is an error. I explore how it was that such a transpar-
ently ludicrous idea has gained such wide currency and
explicate some of the fundamental deficiencies of the
megatrial methodology which mean that – in most cases –
megatrials are highly prone to mislead. Properly under-
stood, the results of large, simplified, randomized trails can
be understood only against a background of a great deal
of other information, especially information derived from
more scientifically rigorous research methods.
Reasons for the supposed superiority of
megatrials
How did the illusion of the superiority of megatrials come
about? There are probably three main reasons – historical,
managerial, and methodological.
1. Historical
When large randomized controlled trials emerged from the
middle 1960s, it was as a methodology intended to come
at the end of a long process of drug development [1]. For
instance, tricyclic and monoamine-oxidase-inhibitor antide-
pressants were synthesized in the 1950s, and their toxic-
ity, dosage, clinical properties, and side effects were
elucidated almost wholly by means of clinical observa-
tions, in animal studies, ‘open’, uncontrolled studies, and
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small, highly controlled trials [2]. Only after about a
decade of worldwide clinical use was a large (by contem-
porary standards), placebo-controlled, comparison, ran-
domized trial executed by the UK Medical Research
Council (MRC), in 1965 – and even then, the dose of the
monoamine-oxidase inhibitor chosen was too low. So, a
great deal was already known about antidepressants
before a large RCT was planned. It was already known
that antidepressants worked – and the function of the trial
was merely to estimate the magnitude of the effect size.
Nowadays, because of the widespread overvaluation of
megatrials, the process of drug development has almost
been turned upon its head. Instead of megatrials coming
at the end of a long process of drug development, after a
great deal of scientific information and clinical experience
has accumulated, it is sometimes argued that drugs
should not even be made available to patients until after
megatrials have been completed. For instance, 1999 saw
the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) delay
the introduction of the anti-influenza agent Relenza®
(zanamivir) with the excuse that there had been insufficient
evidence from RCTs to justify clinical use, thus preventing
the kind of detailed, practical, clinical evaluation that is
actually a prerequisite to rigorous trial design.
It is not sufficiently appreciated that one cannot design an
appropriate megatrial until one already knows a great deal
about the drug. This prior knowledge is required to be
able to select the right subjects, choose an optimal dose,
and create a protocol that controls for distorting variables.
If a megatrial is executed without such knowledge, then it
will simplify where it ought to be controlling: eg patients
will be recruited who are actually unsuitable for treatment,
they will be given the trial drug in incorrect doses, patients
taking interfering drugs will not be excluded, etc. Conse-
quently, such premature megatrials will usually tend sys-
tematically to underestimate the effect size of a new drug.
2. Managerial – changes in research personnel
Before megatrials could become so widely and profoundly
misunderstood, it was necessary that the statistical
aspects of research should become wildly overvalued.
Properly, statistics is a means to the end of scientific
understanding [3] – and when studying medical interven-
tions, the nature of scientific understanding could be
termed ‘clinical science’ – an enterprise for which the
qualifications would include knowledge of disease and
experience of patients [1]. People with such qualifications
would provide the basis for a leadership role in research
into the effectiveness of drugs and other technologies.
Instead, recent decades have seen biostatisticians and
epidemiologists rise to a position of primacy in the organi-
zation, funding, and refereeing of medical research – in
other words, people whose knowledge of disease and
patients in relation to any particular medical treatment is
second-hand at best and nonexistent at worst.
The reason for this hegemony of the number-crunchers is
not, of course, anything to do with their possessing scien-
tific superiority, nor even a track record of achievement;
but has a great deal to do with the needs of managerialism
– a topic that lies beyond the scope of this essay [4].
3. Methodological – masking of clinical inapplicability
by statistical precision
There are also methodological reasons behind the
aggrandizement of megatrials. As therapy has advanced,
clinicians have come to expect incremental, quantitative
improvements in already effective interventions, rather than
qualitative ‘breakthroughs’ and the development of wholly
new treatment methods. This has led to demands for ever-
increasing precision in the measurement of therapeutic
effectiveness, as the concern has been expressed that the
modest benefits of new treatment could be obscured by
random error. Furthermore, when expected effect sizes are
relatively small, it becomes increasingly difficult to disen-
tangle primary therapeutic effects from confounding
factors. Of course, where confounders (such as age, sex,
severity of illness) are known, they can be controlled by
selective recruitment. But selective recruitment tends to
make trials small.
Megatrials appear to offer the ability to deal with these
problems. Instead of controlling confounders by rigorous
selection of subjects and tight protocols, confounding is
dealt with by randomly allocating subjects between the
comparison groups, and using sufficiently large numbers
of subjects so that any confounders (including unknown
ones) may be expected to balance each other out [5]. The
large numbers of subjects also offer unprecedented dis-
criminative power to obtain statistically precise measure-
ments of the outcomes of treatment [6]. Even modest,
stepwise increments of therapeutic progress could, in
principle, be resolved by sufficiently large studies.
Resolving power, in a strictly statistical sense, is appar-
ently limited only by the numbers of subjects in the trial –
and very large numbers of patients can be recruited by
using simple protocols in multiple research centres [6].
Analysis of megatrials requires comparison of the average
outcome in each allocation group (ie by ‘intention to treat’)
rather than by treatment received. This is necessitated by
the absolute dependence upon randomization rather than
rigorous protocols to deal with confounding [5]. So, in
pursuit of precision, randomized trials have grown ever
larger and simpler. More recently, there has been a fashion
for pooling data from such trials to expand the number of
subjects still further in a process called meta-analysis [7] –
this can be considered an extension of the megatrial idea,
with all its problems multiplied [8]. For instance, results of
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meta-analyses differ among themselves, in relation to RCT
information, and may diverge from scientific and clinical
knowledge of pharmacology and physiology [9]
The problem is that ‘simplification’ of protocol translates
into scientific terms as deliberate reduction in the level of
experimental control. This is employed with good inten-
tions – in order to increase recruitment, consistency, and
compliance [5], and is vital to the creation of huge data-
bases from randomized subjects. However, as I have
argued elsewhere, the strategy of expanding size by dimin-
ishing control is a methodological mistake [10]. Reduced
experimental control inevitably means less informational
content in a trial. At the absurd extreme, the ultimate
megatrial would recruit an unselected population of
anybody at all, and randomize subjects to a protocol that
would not, however, necessarily bear any relation to what
actually happened to the subject from then on. So long as
the outcomes were analysed according to the protocol to
which the subject had originally been randomized, then
this would be statistically acceptable. The apparent basis
for the mistake of deliberately reducing experimental rigour
in megatrials seems to be an imagined, but unreal, trade-
off between rigour and size – perhaps resulting from the
observation that small, rigorous trials and large, simple
trials may have similar ‘confidence interval’ statistics [10].
Yet these methodologies are not equivalent: in science the
protocol defines the experiment, and different protocols
imply different studies examining different questions in dif-
ferent populations [5].
Assumptions behind the megatrial
methodology
Megatrials could be defined as RCTs in which recruitment
is the primary methodological imperative. The common
assumption has been that with the advent of megatrials,
clinicians now have an instrument that can provide esti-
mates and comparisons of therapeutic effectiveness that
are both clinically applicable and statistically precise. Wide-
spread adoption of megatrials has been based upon the
assumption that their results could be extrapolated beyond
the immediate circumstances of the trial and used to deter-
mine, or at least substantially influence, clinical practice.
However, this question of generalizing from the average
result of megatrials to individual patients has never been
satisfactorily resolved. Many clinicians are aware of
serious problems [11,12], and yet these problems have
been largely ignored by the advocates of a trial-led
approach to practice.
Extrapolation from megatrials to practice has been justified
on the basis of several assertions. It has been assumed (if
not argued) that high levels of experimental rigour are not
important in RCTs because the randomization of large
numbers of subjects compensates (in some undefined
way) for lower levels of control. This is a mistaken argu-
ment based on a statistical confusion: large, poorly con-
trolled trials may have a similar confidence interval to that
in a small, well controlled trial (a large scatter divided by
the square root of large numbers may be numerically equal
to a smaller scatter divided by the square root of smaller
numbers) – but this does not mean that the studies are
equivalent [5]. The smaller, better-controlled study is
superior. Different protocols mean a different experiment,
and low control means less information. After all, if poor
control were better than good control, scientists would
never need to do experiments – control is of the essence
of experiment.
Furthermore, it is routinely assumed that the average
effect measured among the many thousands of patients in
a megatrial group is also a measure of the probability of an
intervention producing this same effect in an individual
patient. In other words, it is assumed that the megatrial
result and its confidence interval can serve as an estimate
of the probability of a given outcome in an individual
patient to whom the trial result might be applied.
This is not the case. Even when a megatrial population is
representative of a clinical population (something very
rarely achieved), when trial populations are heteroge-
neous average outcomes do not necessarily reflect prob-
abilities in individuals. To take a fictional example:
supposing a drug called ‘Fluzap’ shortens an illness by 5
days if that illness is influenza and if patients actually take
the drug. Then suppose that the trial population also con-
tains patients who do not have influenza (because of non-
rigorous recruitment criteria) and also patients who
(despite being randomized to ‘Fluzap’) do not take the
drug — suppose that in such subjects, the drug ‘Fluzap’
has no effect. Then the average effect size for ‘Fluzap’
according to intention-to-treat analysis would be a value
intermediate between zero and five – eg that ‘Fluzap’
shortened the episode of influenza by about a day. This
trial result may be statistically acceptable, but it does not
apply to any individual patient. The value of such a ran-
domized trial as a guide to treatment is therefore some-
what questionable, and the mass dissemination of such a
summary statistic through the professional and lay press
would seem to be politically, rather than scientifically,
motivated.
Confidence intervals – confidence trick?
The decline in scientific rigour associated with the mega-
trial methodology has been disguised by the standard sta-
tistical displays used to express the outcome of
megatrials. Megatrials typically quote the statistic called
the ‘confidence interval’ (CI) as their summary estimate of
therapeutic outcome; or else quote the average outcome
for each protocol and a measure of the ‘statistical signifi-
cance’ of any measured difference between averages.
Available online http://cvm.controlled-trials.com/content/2/1/002
com
m
entary
review
reports
prim
ary research
But although the confidence interval has been promoted
as an improvement on significance tests [13], it has
serious problems when used for clinical purposes, and is
not a useful summary statistic for determining practical
applications of a trial. The confidence interval describes
the parameters within which the ‘true’ mean of a therapeu-
tic trial can be considered to lie – with a quoted degree of
probability and given certain rigorous (and seldom-met)
statistical assumptions [14].
Clinicians need measures of outcome among individual
patients in a trial, especially the nature and degree of vari-
ation in the outcome. The confidence interval simply does
not tell the clinician what he or she needs to know in order
to decide how useful the results of a megatrial would be
for implementation in clinical practice. Average results and
confidence intervals from megatrials conceal an enormous
diversity among the results for individual subjects – for
example, an average effect size for a drug is uninformative
when there is huge variation between individuals.
When used to summarize large data sets, the confidence-
interval statistic gives no readily apprehended indication of
the scatter of patient outcomes, because it includes the
square root of the number of patients as denominator (confi-
dence interval equals standard deviation divided by square
root of n) [15]. This creates the misleading impression that
big studies are better, because simply increasing the number
of patients will increase the divisor of the fraction, which will
powerfully tend to reduce the size of the confidence interval
when trials become ‘mega’ in size. Consequently, the confi-
dence interval will usually reduce as studies enlarge,
although the scatter of outcomes (eg the standard deviation)
may remain the same, or more probably will increase as a
result of simplified protocols and poorer control.
The exceptionally narrow ‘confidence intervals’ generated
by megatrials (and even more so by meta-analyses) are
often misunderstood to mean that doctors can be very
‘confident’ that the trial estimates of therapeutic effective-
ness are valid and accurate. This is untrue both in narrowly
statistical and broadly clinical senses. In fact, the confi-
dence interval per se gives no indication whatsoever of
the precision of an estimate with regard to the individual
subjects in a trial. Furthermore, the narrowness of a confi-
dence interval does not have any necessary relation to the
reality of a proposed causal relation, nor does it give any
indication of the applicability of a trial result to another
population. Indeed, since the confidence interval gives no
guide to the equivalence of the populations under compar-
ison, differences between trial results may be due to bias
rather than causation. [16].
So, narrow, nonoverlapping confidence intervals, which
discriminate sharply between protocols in a statistical
sense, may nevertheless be associated with qualitative
variation between subjects such that a minority of patients
are probably actively harmed by a treatment that benefits
the majority [17].
Measures of scatter needed for clinical
interpretation
It would be more useful to the clinician if randomized trials
were to display their results in terms of the scatter of
patient outcomes, rather than averages. This may be
approximated by a scattergram display of trial results, with
each individual patient outcome represented as a dot.
Such a display allows an estimate of experimental control
as well as statistical precision, since poorly controlled
studies will have very wide scatters of results with substan-
tial overlaps between alternative protocols. The fact that
such displays are almost never seen for megatrials sug-
gests that they would be highly revealing of the scientifi-
cally slipshod methods routinely employed by such studies.
If this graphic display of all results is too unwieldy even for
modern computerized graphics, a reasonable numerical
approximation that gives the average outcome with a
measure of scatter is also useful – for example, the mean
and standard deviation, or the median with interquartile
range [14]. These types of presentation allow the clinician
to see at a glance, or at least swiftly calculate, what range
of outcomes followed a given intervention in the trial, and
therefore (all else being equal, and when proper standards
of rigour and representativeness apply) the probability of a
given outcome in an individual patient.
While the confidence-interval statistic will usually give a mis-
leadingly clear-cut impression of any difference between the
averages of two interventions being compared, a mean and
standard deviation reveal the degree of overlap in results.
When the confidence interval relates to an interval scale, it
may indeed be possible to use the confidence interval to
generate an approximate standard-deviation statistic. This is
done on the basis that the 95% CI is (roughly) two ‘stan-
dard-error-of-the-mean’ (SEM) values above and below the
mean [15]. The SEM is the standard deviation divided by the
square root of n. Therefore, if the difference between the
mean and the confidence limit is halved to give the SEM, and
if the SEM is multiplied by the square root of n, this will yield
the approximate standard deviation. The above calculation
may be a worthwhile exercise, because it is often surprising
to discover the enormous scatter of outcomes that lie hidden
within a tight-looking confidence interval. However, most
megatrials use proportional measures of outcome (eg per-
centage mortality rate, or 5-year survival), and these mea-
sures cannot be converted to standard deviations by the
above method, or by any other convenient means.
Confidence intervals therefore have no readily comprehen-
sible relation to confidence concerning outcomes – which
is the variable of interest to clinicians. What is required
instead of confidence intervals is a display, or numerical
measure, of scatter that assists the practitioner in deciding
the clinical importance that should be attached to ‘statisti-
cally significant’ differences between average results.
A false hierarchy of research methods leads
to an uncritical attitude to RCTs
There is a widespread perception that RCTs are the ‘gold
standard’ of clinical research (a hackneyed phrase). It is rou-
tinely stated that randomized trials are ‘the best’ evidence,
followed by cohort studies, case–control studies, surveys,
case series, and finally single case studies (quoted by Olkin
[7]). This hierarchy of methods seems to have attained the
status of unquestioned dogma. In other words, the belief is
that RCTs are intrinsically superior to other forms of epi-
demiological or scientific study, and therefore offer results
of greater validity than the alternatives.
To anyone with a scientific background, this idea of a hier-
archy of methods is amazing nonsense, and belief in such
a hierarchy constitutes conclusive evidence of scientific
illiteracy. The validity of a piece of science is not deter-
mined by its method – as if gene sequencing were ‘better
than’ electron microscopy! For example, contrary to the
hierarchical dogma, individual case studies are not intrinsi-
cally inferior to group studies – they merely have different
uses [18]. The great physiologist Claude Bernard pointed
out many years ago that the averaging involved in group
studies is a potentially misleading procedure that must be
justified in each specific instance [19]. When case studies
are performed as qualitative tests of a pre-existing explicit
and detailed hypothetical model, they exemplify the
highest standards of scientific rigour – each case serving
as an independent test of the hypothesis [20,21]. Individ-
ual human case studies are frequently published in top
scientific journals such as Nature and Science.
Validity is conferred not by the application of a method or
technique, nor by the size of a study, nor even by the diffi-
culty and expense of the study, but only by the degree of
rigour (ie the level of experimental control) with which a
given study is able to test a research question. Since mega-
trials deliberately reduce the level of experimental control in
order to maximize recruitment, this means that megatrial
results invariably require very careful interpretation.
NNT – not necessarily true
The assumption just mentioned is embodied in that cher-
ished evidence-based medicine (EBM) tool, the comparison
of two interventions in terms of the ‘number needed to
treat’, or NNT [22]. The NNT expresses the difference
between the outcomes of two rival trial protocols in terms of
how many patients must be treated for how long in order to
prevent one adverse event. For instance, comparing beta-
blocker with placebo in hypertension may yield an NNT of
13 patients treated for 5 years to prevent one stroke.
However, the apparent simplicity and clarity of this informa-
tion depends upon the clinical target population having the
same risk–benefit profile as the randomized trial population.
When trial and target populations differ and the trial popula-
tion is unrepresentative of the target population, the NNT
will be an inaccurate estimate of effect size for the actual
patients whose treatment is being considered. For instance,
an elderly population may be more vulnerable to the adverse
effects of a drug and less responsive to its therapeutic
effect, to the point where an intervention that produces an
average benefit to the young may be harmful in the old.
On top of this, the patients in a megatrial population are
always prognostically heterogeneous, because the
methodology uses deliberately simplified protocols
designed to optimize recruitment rather than control – and
meta-analyses are even more heterogeneous [3,8]. In a
megatrial that shows an overall benefit, it is very probable
that while the outcome for some patients will be improved
by treatment, other patients will be made worse, and others
will be unaffected. What this means is that even a repre-
sentative megatrial (and such trials are exceedingly uncom-
mon) cannot provide a risk estimate of what will happen to
individual patients who are allocated the same protocol.
Trials on unrepresentative populations may, of course, be
actively misleading. The NNT generated by a megatrial
does not in itself, therefore, provide guidance for clinical
management. The NNT is Not Necessarily True! [22].
Conclusion
Megatrials, like other kinds of epidemiological study,
should be considered as primarily methods for precise
measurement rather than a scientific method for generat-
ing or testing a hypothesis [10]. Precise measurements of
the effect size of medical interventions such as drugs
should be attempted only when a great deal is known
about the drug and its clinical actions. When megatrials
are conducted without sufficient background scientific
and clinical knowledge, they will be measuring mainly arte-
facts. Unless – for instance – a trial is performed on
pathologically and prognostically homogeneous popula-
tions, and uses well controlled management protocols, the
apparent precision of the result is more spurious than real.
Megatrials have become an unassailable ‘gold standard’ in
some quarters. And this situation has become self-perpet-
uating, since the results of megatrials have become de
facto untestable. Since megatrials are not testing hypothe-
ses, because they are merely measuring the magnitude of
an effect, the result of a megatrial is itself not an hypothe-
sis, and cannot be tested using other methods. A mega-
trial of, say, an antihypertensive drug measures the
comparative effect of that drug under the circumstances
of the trial. Assuming that no calculation mistakes have
been made, this result of a megatrial is neither right nor
wrong: it is just a measurement.
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People often talk of megatrials as if they proved or dis-
proved the hypothesis that a drug ‘works’. Far from being
the final word on determining the effectiveness of a
therapy, this is a question that a megatrial is inherently
incapable of answering. But once the error has been
made of assuming that a statistical measurement can test
a hypothesis, the mistake becomes uncorrectable,
because the level of statistical precision in a megatrial is
greater than that attainable by other methods.
In such an environment of compounded error, it should not
really be a source of surprise that statistical considera-
tions utterly overwhelm scientific knowledge and clinical
understanding, and we end up with the lunacy of regard-
ing statisticians and epidemiologists as the final arbiters of
medical decision-making. Health care becomes merely a
matter of managers providing systems to ‘implement’
whatever the number-crunching technocrats tell them is
supported by ‘the best evidence’ [4]. The methodological
deficiencies of megatrials make them ideally suited to pro-
viding an intellectual underpinning for that world of join-
the-dots medicine which seems just around the corner.
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